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DISCUSSION
In recent years, physicians and administrators have worked
tirelessly to reduce hospital stays with the understanding that
LOS is a good surrogate for cost. The thinking has been that
lopping 1 day off of the end of an inpatient stay reduces the
overall cost by the mean cost of a day in the hospital. Unfortunately,
this widely held perception is incorrect. The reason is that
not all hospital days are economically equivalent. Tables 1 to
7 show a reliable rule of thumb, at least for our hospital and
our trauma service: On average, the last full day of hospitalization
involves incremental resource costs in the range of just $400
to $450. Cutting this day would save the hospital only a small
percentage of the total cost of care.
The basic truth is that the bulk of health care expenses take
the form of overhead, or they are incurred early in patients'
hospital stays. This comes as no surprise to practicing physicians
who recognize that the early phase of care involves expensive
diagnosis and intervention, while the final days are essentially
recuperative.
Yet, for four reasons, even these figures overstate the impact
that reductions in LOS have on health care costs. Suppose, for
example, that our trauma service set out to discharge every eligible
patient on average 10% sooner than it does now. Would it save
even 2% to 3% of total costs? The answer is almost certainly
not. First, 44% of the service's 665 patients in fiscal year
1998 simply could not have been discharged much faster, either
because they died (n = 46), they were discharged against medical
advice (n = 4), or they already had stays of 3 days or less (n
= 242). Second, to achieve this 10% LOS reduction, the trauma
service would likely focus on patients who were relatively healthy.
These likely candidates for reduced LOS are also the cheapest
patients to retain in the hospital. Cutting their LOS does relatively
little to reduce aggregate costs. Third, discharging patients
10% faster is not equivalent to eliminating the attendant end-of-stay
costs. To accomplish the 10% LOS reduction, some treatments (eg,
laboratory tests) must be accelerated and other treatments (eg,
pharmaceuticals) must be continued on an outpatient basis. These
costs would be shifted rather than eliminated. This is especially
true when patients are discharged to other facilities or to home
health care.
Fourth and finally, in this study all expenses surrounding
nurses directly involved in patient care were categorized as
variable direct costs. This approach presumes that staff can
be adjusted quickly as patient activity ebbs and flows. This
categorization is appropriate if the hospital uses substantial
amounts of nursing overtime (which is the case at the University
of Michigan) or if there is considerable nursing turnover. But
if nurses are salaried or if the time horizon for decision making
is very short (meaning that the hospital is committed to its
staffing levels), then it may be more appropriate to treat nursing
as a fixed cost.8 Because nursing represents the majority of
end-of-stay costs, shifting even a portion of these expenditures
out of the category of variable direct costs would have a profound
impact on the results reported here.
Our analysis raises the following question: Does LOS truly
matter? Although our university hospital has a tertiary referral-based
population, we strongly believe that our results generalize to
most hospital settings. Within most hospitals and health systems,
most costs take the form of overhead charges, and the preponderance
of variable costs are incurred very early in patients' hospital
stays. Put differently, our results would not generalize only
if our higher costs of care stem strictly from significantly
greater overhead rather than higher costs across the board, or
if we are unique among hospitals in paring end-of-stay variable
direct costs. We have no reason to suspect that this is the case.
It is important to note that this analysis presumes that the
hospital has excess capacity, so that retaining any given patient
in the hospital does not preclude admitting other patients. Hospitals
facing capacity constraints encounter what economists call "opportunity
costs,'' meaning that those hospitals would have to forgo the
opportunity to care for new patients to keep existing patients
in house longer. In the event of such capacity constraints, hospitals
should explicitly factor in these opportunity costs. From a revenue
perspective, when the health system is at capacity, it is more
effective to take in new "high-revenue'' admissions by discharging
"low-revenue'' patients who are in the convalescent phase
of their recovery. If there are capacity constraints, the case
for reducing LOS may become much more compelling, both financially
and medically. One important limitation of this study is that
it does not explicitly factor opportunity costs (which are notoriously
difficult to measure) into the analysis.
Our analysis also depends upon the accuracy and integrity
of the University of Michigan's cost-accounting system, and this
is the most important limitation of the study. The most immediate
concern involves the categorization of costs into the variable
direct category. Whenever costs are difficult to allocate to
individual patients, hospitals (like other businesses) must count
them instead as overhead, even though they might actually vary
directly with patient activity. Hospital finance has identified
for us the three activities where expenses are allocated to the
indirect-cost component even though they arguably belong in the
category of variable direct costs: dietetic services ($5.7 million
total cost in fiscal year 1998), housecleaning ($8.9 million),
and transcription ($11.2 million). These costs are substantial,
but they are not an especially large percentage (8.6%) of the
$301 million in total costs of running the hospital. More important,
none of these activities is likely to involve much in terms of
end-of-stay costs. Finally, we believe that the University of
Michigan is as aggressive as any hospital in the country in tagging
costs to individual patients (which readers can confirm by asking
their own administrators whether they include dietetic services,
housecleaning, and transcription in their variable direct costs).
As such, replicating this study at other institutions would likely
yield results that, if anything, are starker than those reported
here. In short, we have confidence in our hospital finance department
and the accounting mechanisms they have in place.
It is also important to remain aware that from the payers'
perspective, the savings from a reduced LOS depend upon that
payer's contractual relationship with the health system. In a
fixed-fee reimbursement system, the payer has no strong financial
stake in a patient's LOS. In a traditional fee-for-service system,
however, reimbursement is a function of charges, which typically
involve a markup over total costs. The implication is that the
payers' savings from reducing LOS by 1 day could amount to $1,000
or more. In short, although the incremental resource cost of
retaining a typical patient for 1 additional day is $400 to $450,
fee-for-service payers may reimburse several times this amount.7
They are understandably eager for hospitals to discharge patients
quickly.
Historically, LOS may have been a relatively simple and useful
surrogate for costs. It was easily obtainable, difficult to manipulate,
and directly comparable across institutions. Few hospitals had
accounting systems that allowed them to monitor their actual
costs, and although physicians had little control over overhead
and saw little or no professional incentive to pursue what are
typically perceived as administrative activities, they could
work successfully to reduce LOS. One way to interpret this study's
results is that the success of these endeavors has left little
room for further economically significant reductions in LOS.
Much of the return has been achieved. Focusing substantial physician
effort on further reductions in hospital LOS will yield little
value.
If LOS is no longer a source of additional cost reductions,
where should physicians focus their efforts? It is critical that
physicians play more active roles in two key areas. First, they
must work with hospital administrators to make better use of
hospital capacity and overhead, which account for the majority
of the inpatient hospital costs. Such efforts must include some
combination of capacity reductions; optimal use of existing capacity;
and a shift in patient activities, whenever possible, to off-peak
periods when beds, operating rooms, and other key facilities
have historically sat idle. These efforts should also include
physician participation in efforts toward networking, including
building better relationships with referring physicians at other
institutions. Recruiting new patients can help to control costs
by enabling hospitals to amortize their overhead over a larger
population. Second, physicians must work to reduce costs in the
early stages of their patients' care. Costs disproportionately
arise early rather than late in any given hospital stay, and
measures that curtail these costs will have economically important
effects.
For their part, hospital administrators must keep their physicians
well informed and provide them with incentives, including professional
rewards, to encourage them to participate in these activities.
Together, physicians and administrators must optimize health
system strategy, operations management, payer contract negotiations,
and health system finance.
Introduction
| Methods
| Results
| Discussion | References
JACS |